Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZimmerman, Randi
dc.contributor.authorChinn, Clark
dc.identifier.citationZimmerman, R. & Chinn, C. (2020). Epistemic Injustices Obstruct Reliable Epistemic Practices. In Gresalfi, M. and Horn, I. S. (Eds.), The Interdisciplinarity of the Learning Sciences, 14th International Conference of the Learning Sciences (ICLS) 2020, Volume 1 (pp. 517-520). Nashville, Tennessee: International Society of the Learning Sciences.en_US
dc.description.abstractEpistemic injustice is a specific type of harm that occurs when people are unfairly treated in their capacity as knower (Fricker, 2007). One harm that may come from epistemic injustice is that people are denied their ability to become full epistemic agents either on their own or as part of a greater knowledge production process. In this paper, we address the consequences of epistemic injustices for knowledge production processes. We argue that when pertinent experiences, knowledge, or expertise that would be provided by the harmed person is left out of a knowledge production process, the community is denied that knowledge, as well as the ability to leverage that knowledge into an alternative or deeper understanding of the situation at hand. Therefore, epistemic injustices are not only unethical. Epistemic injustices obstruct reliable epistemic practices. We discuss implications of issues of epistemic injustice for scholarship on epistemic cognition.en_US
dc.publisherInternational Society of the Learning Sciences (ISLS)en_US
dc.subjectLearning and Identityen_US
dc.titleEpistemic Injustices Obstruct Reliable Epistemic Practicesen_US
dc.typeShort Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:ICLS 2020

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
517-520.pdf189.62 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.